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ABSTRACT. One of the important issues raised by the European integration is
that of languages and in particular how the EU institutions can cope with language
diversity. In this paper, I develop an analysis aimed at assessing the quality of
language regimes not in absolute terms, but rather in terms of their consistency with
the actors’ goals, which deﬁne what we call a ‘scenario’. The paper focuses on the
European Parliament as it was confronted with the challenges of enlargement. It
compares the economic and political advantages and drawbacks of six language
regimes under three diﬀerent scenarios. Results show that various language regimes
can be optimal depending on the scenario considered and that multilingualism does
not imply inevitably an unsustainable increase in expenditures.
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Introduction
The increase in the number of the European Union’s (EU) oﬃcial
and working languages has been one of the main issues raised by
the enlargement. Every new Member State (10), except Cyprus, has
added a new language to the previous 11, and today the oﬃcial
and working languages of the EU are 20.1 Of course, the EU, as
1 Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek,
Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Slovak, Slo-
vene, Spanish and Swedish. Due to a lack of qualiﬁed translators in Maltese, some
temporary derogation measures to the drafting in Maltese have been adopted (OJ L
169/1, 1 May 2004).
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was foreseeable, has adopted several technical and organisational
measures in order to better cope with the change. The Council, for
example, has adopted a system of interpreting ‘upon request’ for
the meetings of some preparatory groups (Council of the European
Union, 2005) and the Parliament has recommended length restric-
tions for certain documents in order to reduce the need for transla-
tion (European Parliament, 2004a). However, full multilingualism
as a general principle has been ﬁnally conﬁrmed.2
What could be seen at ﬁrst sight as an unjustiﬁed indulgence
towards ‘small’ languages and a waste of money is in reality a highly
sensitive political question. It is common knowledge that languages
fulﬁl two functions that cannot easily be separated: a communica-
tive function, i.e. the transmission of information in a broad sense,
and a symbolic function, associated with cultural and political traits,
for example with people’s sense of national identity (see Edwards,
1985). Therefore, it is not surprising that the solutions adopted by
the EU often represent a compromise between diﬀerent and con-
trasting visions about what multilingualism management is.3 How-
ever, we do not intend to intervene directly in the political debate on
the EU language regime and recommend a given model because of a
certain universal principle. For example, in our opinion, it is not
very useful to say that a given language regime is too expensive in
absolute terms. Rather, what we can say is whether a given language
regime is too expensive within a given framework, or, putting it dif-
ferently, whether it is too expensive with respect to actors’ goals.
The methodology that I follow refers to public policy analysis:
ﬁrst, it takes a certain institutional and political framework (or
‘scenario’) for given, this being deﬁned by actors’ goals in a politi-
cal debate. Second, within a given scenario it evaluates which lan-
guage regimes, seen as a particular type of language policy, are best
suited to comply with these goals, taking into account both dimen-
sions of language. By doing this, I deliberately follow the approach
of Pool (1996) and Grin (1997), who tackle the question of the
optimal language regime for the EU and show that various
2 For the purposes of this article, no distinction is made between ‘multilingual’
and ‘plurilingual’, both being deﬁned as referring to the presence or use of more than
one language (Clyne, 1997: 301).
3 Grin (2004a, b) and Van Parijs (2004a, b) tackle in contrasting ways the issue of
linguistic justice, inequality and unfairness in communication in the EU. Haszpra
(2004) and Selten (1997) analyse diﬀerent economic aspects of multilingualism.
Phillipson (2003) oﬀers an in-depth analysis of the contradictions of multilingual
communication within EU institutions.
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solutions may be optimal, depending on the goals pursued and on
demolinguistic, communicational and institutional conditions.
The paper proceeds as follows: in ‘a brief overview of multi-
lingualism management in the EU’ section, I shall recall, without
going into detail, how multilingualism is actually managed and what
the main variables at stake are. These are variables of legal, political,
cultural, functional and budgetary nature. The importance given by
actors to these variables will deﬁne diﬀerent possible scenarios or,
putting it diﬀerently, diﬀerent outcomes of a political debate. In ‘lan-
guage policy evaluation in the European Parliament’, I apply my ap-
proach to the EP as it is confronted with the challenges of
enlargement. I compare the advantages and the drawbacks of six lan-
guage regimes within three diﬀerent scenarios, and I ﬁnally assess
which models are best suited to meet the actors’ objectives. Results
conﬁrm that no language regime can be considered the best solution
in absolute terms, in accordance with the theoretical conclusions of
Pool (1996) and Grin (1997). Results also show that the use of more
languages does not imply inevitably an unsustainable increase in
expenditures. The last section provides a discussion and conclusions.
A Brief Overview of Multilingualism Management in the EU
In this section, I present the signiﬁcant groups of variables that are
usually recalled in the issue of European multilingualism with no
claim of exhaustiveness.4 This is necessary in order to understand
the context in which I want to carry out the analysis. I consider
here the institutions of the EU, its two advisory bodies, and the
European Central Bank (ECB), leaving aside the issue of communi-
cation in European civil society.
According to the Treaties, it is the responsibility of the Council
to decide on the EUs language regime, by unanimous vote, without
prejudice to the Statute of the Court of Justice (Article 290 of the
EC Treaty and Article 190 of the Euratom Treaty). In 1958 the
Council approved Regulation no. 1, the text containing the basic
provisions for the language regime of European institutions.5 Since
then, the language regime has been extended to new languages at
every enlargement on request of new Member States and the
4 For more detailed descriptions (see, e.g., Labrie, 1993; De Swaan, 2001; Herb-
illon, 2003; Phillipson, 2003; De Elera, 2004; Gazzola, 2006).
5 OJ L 17, 6 October 1958, p. 385, as amended after every new enlargement.
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engagement of the EU towards multilingualism has been conﬁrmed
to date. For example, Regulation no. 1/58 has been modiﬁed in
2005 so that Irish will become an oﬃcial and working language of
the EU in 2007, whereas until now it has only been one of the lan-
guages of the Treaties.6 Second, in some particular cases, by re-
quest of a Member State and at its own expense, it will also be
allowed to use ‘languages other than the languages referred to in
Regulation no. 1/58, whose status is recognised by the Constitution
of a Member State on all or part of its territory or the use of
which as a national language is authorised by law’ (OJ C 148, 18
June 2005 p. 1–2).
Although no diﬀerence is made between oﬃcial and working
languages in Regulation no. 1/58 (art. 1), in the literature there is
an operational distinction between them. Thus, ‘oﬃcial languages’
of the EU are generally deﬁned as those used in communication
between institutions and the outside world, and ‘working lan-
guages’ of the EU as those used between institutions, within insti-
tutions and during internal meetings convened by the institutions
(Labrie, 1993: 82). For the purposes of this paper, I adopt these
deﬁnitions.
Table 1 shows how multilingual communication in the EU is
currently managed. In communication towards citizens and the
Member States, the EU tries to adopt full multilingual communica-
tion in the 20 oﬃcial languages, which is managed through lan-
guage services.7 For its internal activities, in general, two diﬀerent
approaches have been adopted. The ﬁrst one concerns the activities
of representative institutions and bodies, namely, the European
Parliament (EP), which represents the European peoples; the Coun-
cil, representing the interests of the national governments; the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
representing, respectively, the forces of European economic and
social life, and regional and local authorities within the Union.
Here multilingual communication in the 20 working languages has
generally been implemented, although diﬀerent solutions can be
adopted within the same institution, as we will see hereafter. On
the contrary, for a second group of institutions and bodies, which
includes in particular the Commission, the Court of Auditors, the
European Central Bank and to a certain extent the Court of Justice,
6 OJ L 156, 18 June 2005 p. 3–4. As regards the languages of the Treaties, see for
example article 314 European Community (EC) Treaty.
7 With respect to this, see art. 2–5 of the Regulation no. 1/58.
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multilingual communication is usually managed through a limitation
of the number of working languages.
It is necessary to stress that, although article 6 of Regulation no.
1/58 authorises a certain degree of ﬂexibility with regards to the use
of languages for internal activities, there are no rules stating speciﬁ-
cally which languages have to be used as working languages.8
Hence, the choice of working languages is just a matter of practice
and no language can a priori be excluded from being chosen (nor
could it be legally, as the Regulation makes no diﬀerence between
oﬃcial and working languages). English, French and German, for
instance, are not the ‘oﬃcial’ working language of the Commission,
but just the most commonly used languages for its internal activi-
ties (even if German is used far less than the other two).
Reasons Working in Favour of Full Multilingual Communication
Legal issues constitute the ﬁrst domain to be considered. It is common
knowledge that one crucial aspect of the norms of Community law
is the immediate impact they have on the subjective legal situation
of the EU institutions themselves, of Member States and of
individuals. Given this context, while all citizens and companies are
obliged to know and comply with Community law, the problem is
to decide whether it is admissible to ask them to acquire such
TABLE 1
Oﬃcial and working languages in the EU institutions, advisory bodies and ECB.
Institution or body Oﬃcial languages Working languages
European Parliament All 20 languages All 20 languages
Council of the European Union
(Ministers’ meetings)
All 20 languages All 20 languages
European Commission All 20 languages English, French, German
Court of Justice All 20 languages
+ Irish
French
Court of Auditors All 20 languages English, French, German
Economic and Social Committee All 20 languages All 20 languages
Committee of the Regions All 20 languages All 20 languages
European Central Bank All 20 languages English
Source: table compiled by the author using the EU website (www.europa.eu.int),
Herbillon (2003) and information supplied directly by EU oﬃcials.
8 See for example article 6 of the rules of procedure of the Commission, or articles
17.2 and 17.6 of the rules of procedure of the ECB.
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knowledge in a language that they do not master fully. Limiting
the oﬃcial languages would therefore impair equality of rights
(Fenet 2001; De Elera 2004).9
A second signiﬁcant group of variables relates to political issues,
namely democratic participation, the equality of representatives and
the prestige of the Member States. With regards to the question of
the people’s participation in the Union’s political life, it is to be
noted that the EU tries to engage in communication in as ‘inclu-
sive’ a way as possible, as this is supposed to be the best way to
enable people to participate in EU political activities (and, to some
extent, to control it).10 A second political aspect concerns the role
of political forces in representative institutions and bodies (see
above). Here, the EU follows the principle of the equality of politi-
cal representatives, as equality is recognised between what represen-
tatives represent, and as it is necessary to avoid having a limitation
in the use of languages which could translate into an unjustiﬁed
reduction of the political weight of those who cannot discuss issues
in the language that they prefer (Galle 1994: 10; Herbillon 2003:
34).11 A system of equal treatment of languages is therefore estab-
lished and the working languages are 20.
It should be noted that this is not always the case, as it depends
on the nature of the meeting. In the Council, for example, the
equal treatment of the 20 working languages is always respected for
meetings of national ministers, as well as for meetings of the Euro-
pean Council, whereas for meetings of Coreper and certain prepa-
ratory groups, fewer working languages are used (Herbillon, 2003:
34–35). Finally, political and symbolic questions relating to the
prestige of the Member States also have to be considered. An equal
treatment of the Member States’ oﬃcial languages has ultimately
been seen as an aspect of the equal treatment of the parties of the
treaty. Accordingly, communication with the parties generally im-
plies using 20 oﬃcial languages. Prestige also plays a role in inter-
nal communication, but in a diﬀerent way (see below).
9 Some authors propose that the EU, in order to reduce costs, should accept a
certain degree of disenfranchisement, interpreted as ‘‘the percentage of citizens who
would lose their ability to understand EU documents and some discussions’’
(Ginsburgh & Weber 2005: 278).
10 On this subject in general and on democratic participation and linguistic
diversity in particular (see Bourdieu, De Swaan, Hage`ge, Fumaroli, & Wallerstein,
2001; Habermas, 2001; Ives, 2004; Van Parijs, 2004a).
11 For reasons of space this paper will not discuss the tricky question of the
situation of speakers of minority and extra-European languages.
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Cultural issues also play a role. The Treaty of Maastricht gave
the Union the power to act in the ﬁelds of culture and training,
though only in ‘support’ of actions undertaken by Member States
(see Articles 151 and 149 of the EC Treaty). Following this, greater
attention was paid to cultural diversity and the plurality of lan-
guages, and eﬀorts were made to protect and promote them as
such. On the other hand, as Mayer and Palmowski have remarked,
there is not a real common cultural identity within the EU and ‘if
anything, then, Europe’s cultural hallmark has been precisely its
heterogeneity and multiplicity’ (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 582).
In this sense, external – and to a lesser extent, internal – multilin-
gual communication can be seen as a facet of the support given by
the EU to linguistic and cultural diversity.
Reasons Working Against Full Multilingual Communication
A fourth important issue in multilingual environments such as the
EU concerns eﬃciency in communication. Working in diﬀerent lan-
guages slows down work, especially when written texts need to be
translated. In the EU, where work is carried out substantially by
‘international oﬃcials’ and not by political representatives, multilin-
gual communication for internal activities is generally managed
through the limiting of the number of working language. Therefore,
particular attention is paid to the level of international oﬃcials’ lan-
guage skills. We use the term international oﬃcials in a broad sense
in order to include EU commissioners, the judges of the Court of
Justice, the members of the Court of Auditors and of the ECB. The
ambassadors working in Coreper and experts working in the prepa-
ratory groups of the Council are also included in this deﬁnition.
However, while limiting working languages can be justiﬁed by
pragmatic reasons, as in the case of the Commission’s preparatory
works, there is considerable disagreement over the formal criteria
for deciding which and how many working languages there should
be, and their respective ﬁelds of action. As a consequence, the
establishment of ‘linguistic hierarchies’ is entrusted to the delicate
equilibrium of custom (Phillipson, 2003), and in this realm of the
‘unspoken’ arguments of symbolic and diplomatic nature arise and
have arisen (see Phillipson, 2003: 22; Galli Della Loggia, 2005).
Finally, budgetary issues also have to be included in the set of
the relevant variables. With regards to the costs of multilingualism,
the key ﬁgures can be summarised in Table 2.
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It is worth noting that claims for the limiting of languages to be
used usually insist on the need to avoid an ‘unsustainable explosion
of costs’. However, behind this ‘rhetoric of crisis’ the same logical
error always reappears: the fact that a service is costly does not
mean that it is ipso facto too expensive (Grin, 1997: 4). The percep-
tion of how expensive a service is depends on the subjective value
that the observer or the society attributes to it.
Language Policy Evaluation in the European Parliament
Policy makers involved in decisions about multilingualism manage-
ment assign diﬀerent degrees of importance to the variables just
presented and thus create diﬀerent ‘sets of priorities’. I deﬁne ‘set
of priorities’ simply as the outcome of a political debate. Within
this framework, diﬀerent language policies (such as a language
regime) can be assessed in terms of their capacity to be consistent
with the goals set by actors. It is important to stress that both
dimensions of languages must be taken into consideration and an
analysis restricted to one of these two functions is likely to be
TABLE 2
Expenditures for translation and interpretation in 1999 and estimated expenditures
for translation and interpretation per year at full cruising speed after the enlarge-
ment (reached approximately in 2006–2007). Figures in current euros.
Translation Interpretation Total
1999 2006–7a 1999 2006–7 1999b 2006–7
Costs (m) e 523 e 807 e 163 e 238 e 686 e 1045
% on total EU budget (%) 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.8 1
% on administrative
expenditure in the EU (%)
11.6 13 3.6 3.8 15.2 16.8
Cost per citizen per year e 1.4 e 1.8 e 0.4 e 0.5 e 1.8 e 2.3
Source: Table compiled by the author using OJ C 219 E, 1 August 2000 (pp. 128–
129), European Commission (1999: 93, 2005a, b) and information supplied directly
by EU oﬃcials.
a‘‘The costs for translation include salaries, social security, overheads for infra-
structure etc., cost of external translation and operating costs’’ (European
Commission, 2005b). Therefore, these ﬁgures have to be regarded as an estimate of
the costs directly involved in multilingualism.
bFrom the Commission’s summary reply however it is impossible to understand
whether and how these ﬁgures take account of all indirect costs.
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partial and incomplete. For example, deciding to use one working
language rather than another is not just a matter of choosing be-
tween ‘networks’ that give access to a certain number of ‘users’,
but is also and always an implicit choice regarding the allocation of
symbolic resources (in sense used by Bourdieu, 1991).
In order to make the comparison between alternatives possible, it
is necessary to assess the advantages and drawbacks (or ‘costs’ and
‘beneﬁts’ in a broad sense) of each option.12 However, a cost-beneﬁt
analysis of alternative language regimes requires some way of mea-
suring variables that are qualitative, intangible and symbolic. While
expenditures for language services are expressed in monetary form,
how can ‘equality’ or ‘prestige’ be quantiﬁed? I shall not attempt to
ﬁnd an exhaustive answer to this subject, which would require much
more space and theoretical treatment.13 In my opinion, it is more
useful to focus on a single example instead and try to approach these
issues from a concrete perspective. The case of the EP preparing for
enlargement is a good example for this purpose as it is a rare case for
which empirical data is available. For this reason, it oﬀers a fertile
ground to carry out a detailed analysis and it also furnishes a con-
crete frame in which it is possible to deal with the problem of
measuring intangible variables.
In the EP, before enlargement, language services provided for
the direct interpretation and translation into and from all 11 oﬃ-
cial languages, in accordance with a total symmetry model, with a
set of non-systematic exceptions14 (see appendix for all technical
terms). How has the EP faced the diﬃcult challenge of the enlarge-
ment to include nine new languages and hence to reconcile ﬁnancial
criteria with political imperatives? Was equality ‘too expensive’ to
be guaranteed? Let us examine the situation before enlargement
and focus on the debate on the solutions proposed in the Preparing
the Parliament for the Enlarged European Union Report (Podesta`,
2001c). In the working document ‘Linguistic policy: further op-
tions’ (Podesta`, 2001a), annexed to the report, seven diﬀerent lan-
guage regimes were proposed. However, it is important to note that
the models were conceived under the hypothesis of 21 oﬃcial lan-
guages, because it was not sure if Cyprus would have been reuni-
ﬁed before the enlargement, hence requiring the adoption of
Turkish as one of the oﬃcial languages. Hence, where necessary, I
12 See in particular Grin and Vaillancourt (1997: 49–50).
13 We refer for example to Grin (1998).
14 The Finnish booth, for example, provided bi-active interpretation into all
languages and in sometimes the relay was employed (Podesta`, 2001b).
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have adjusted ﬁgures for 20 languages (Table A1, see appendix).15
The seven models proposed were:
1. Monolingualism: use of a single oﬃcial and working language.
2. Nationalisation: maintenance of the pre-enlargement structure
and simple transfer of ﬁnancial responsibility alone to the Mem-
ber States, or transfer of the complete workload to the Member
States.
3. Reduced multilingualism: use of only six oﬃcial and working
languages.
4. Asymmetric systems: these make it possible to speak/write in all
21 oﬃcial languages, but listen/read in only a limited number of
languages (three options are considered: 20-1, 20-3 or 20-6).
5. Controlled multilingualism: this model was proposed to ensure
that all Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) had the
right to speak/write and to listen/read in the language that they
prefer; the diﬀerence between this and pure multilingualism
resides in the internal process of linguistic mediation. The con-
trolled multilingualism model was based on the systematic adop-
tion of management correctives, sometimes already in use in
some multilingual meetings before enlargement, such as making
use of bi-active interpretation for the new languages and gradu-
ally extending this system to the former 11 working languages,
greater use of pivot languages (three in particular), and other
measures such as remote interpretation or greater use of external
freelance linguistic staﬀ.
6. Full multilingualism with management correctives (henceforth
‘corrected full multilingualism’): that was, the extension to all
languages of the former system for 11 languages. Unfortunately,
no more is said and therefore it is not speciﬁed how the existing
management correctives would have been adapted and extended
to the post-enlargement situation.16
7. Pure full multilingualism with 20 languages, with no kind of
management corrective.
Costs have been divided into two categories: running costs and
social costs (Podesta`, 2001a). Running costs are the costs chargeable
15 As an approximation, I have adapted ﬁgures in Table A1 using a ratio of 20/21
(except for models 1 and 3 as it is not necessary). A similar procedure was employed
by Grin (2004b). In any case, this does not change signiﬁcantly the ﬁnal picture (see
Gazzola, 2006 for a scenario with 21 languages).
16 In order to keep the analysis of model 5 tractable, we shall make some further
working assumptions in the next paragraphs.
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to the budget of the EP for the normal operation of a named lan-
guage regime. Social costs refer to the costs to be borne for an early
reduction of the staﬀ currently employed, if a model diﬀering from
the pre-enlargement one implies such staﬀ cuts. However, rather than
in absolute terms, it is more useful to consider the costs of a language
regime in relative terms, that is, in terms of what percentage of the
EP budget they represent, in terms of percentage of the aggregate EU
GDP, and ﬁnally in per capita terms. In 2002, the direct and indirect
costs attributable to multilingualism in the EP were 274 million euros
(Table A2, see appendix). According to Podesta` (2001a), in 2002 this
represented almost 30% of the total EP budget. However, the work-
ing document does not specify which expenditure ceiling has been
used to compute this percentage. Hence, we also propose a more con-
servative estimate of about 27%, which is based on annual expendi-
ture ceiling for 2002 (see Table A3 in the appendix). In absolute
terms, the expenditure for multilingualism in 2002 corresponded to
0.003% of the EU-15 GDP for that year (0.7 e per capita).
It is plausible to assume that the percentage for 2002 has
remained virtually the same over the previous few years, at least
since the 1995 enlargement. In particular, the number of oﬃcial
and working languages has not changed from 1995 to 2004, nor
have budget allocations for administrative expenses increased
disproportionately in real terms (European Commission, 1999).
Hence, as a rule of thumb, I adopt a share of more or less 27–30%
of the EP’s budget as a parameter of the ‘ﬁnancial sustainability’ of
a language regime, interpreted as the hallmark of compatibility be-
tween expenditures for multilingualism and other items, within a
given budget. In addition, I use the GDP share and cost per capita
as absolute terms for comparisons.
To estimate how much of the planned budget of the enlarged
EP a language regime would absorb, it is necessary to refer to
expenditure ceilings for the 2000–2006 period set out in the Berlin
Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999. I focus on the period
after enlargement, that is, mid-2004–2006 (30 months). Working
under some assumptions reﬂected in the ﬁgures in Table A3 (see
appendix), I estimate e 1252.3 million to be the average annual
expenditure ceiling envisaged in the budget for the enlarged EP.
Finally I also propose some rough estimations for the 2007–2013
period (Table A4, see appendix), based on the Financial Perspec-
tives 2007–2013 as set out in the Brussels Interinstitutional Agree-
ment (December 2005) and as adopted by the EP in May 2006.
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Assessing Language Regimes
For the purposes of analysis, I characterise each model by using
two variables: a budgetary variable (the cost by year) and a politi-
cal one, that is, the degree of equality that they ensure among the
MEPs. I focus on the equality of the parties as it has always been
regarded as the most relevant variable for the legitimacy of the EP,
while other non-monetary variables, such as eﬃciency in communi-
cation, have been considered as less important (see for instance
Galle, 1994). The reason underlying this choice is the following:
MEPs are directly elected by European people and not engaged by
the EU institutions. Hence, if we choose a language regime that ex-
cludes some languages, we run the risk of having some candidates
that cannot work once elected. On the other hand, if we choose a
particular restricted language regime prior to elections we run the
risk of inﬂuencing electors’ voting choices, as electors are no longer
free to vote for their preferred candidates regardless of their lin-
guistic skills. In other words, reducing a priori the number of work-
ing languages in the name of communicative eﬃciency in the EP is
again and ﬁrst of all a political decision.
The economic costs are not diﬃcult to measure because they can,
in essence, be identiﬁed with expenses for the linguistic services and
indirect expenses related to multilingualism.17 But what exactly is
meant by ‘equality’? Two observers may have opposite opinions on
whether a situation reﬂects equality, for the simple reason that they
deﬁne equality in diﬀerent ways. Take the example of a language re-
gime ‘A’ that allows MEPs to speak and to listen in their mother ton-
gue, assuming that everyone is monolingual and that all their mother
tongues are oﬃcial and working languages. Does this situation re-
spect the equality of the parties? X could answer positively, as every-
one has the right to speak and to listen in her mother tongue.
However, Y could disagree. Assume, for example, that two lan-
guages, within the set of the oﬃcial languages, are used as pivot lan-
guages. Therefore, Y could point out that two groups of MEPs
receive a direct interpretation, while the others can only listen to
speeches through two mediations and thus with a higher probability
17 For the purposes of this paper I make no distinction between ‘cost’ and
‘expenditure’.
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of error, at a later time and of lower quality than the MEPs who can
enjoy a direct mediation.18 Similar considerations can be made for
translation. X could reply that Y is right, but that in any case the lan-
guage regime ‘A’ guarantees ‘enough equality’ and that it is not wor-
thy spending more resources in order to have ‘more equality.’
Thus, diﬀerent deﬁnitions of equality can be seen quite simply as
diﬀerent ways of attributing value to it. We can therefore prepare an
ordinal scale of deﬁnitions from the most to the least strict, and map
it onto decreasing degrees of importance assigned to equality by ac-
tors. Putting it diﬀerently, each deﬁnition corresponds to the ‘quan-
tity of equality’ desired by actors. For my purposes, I distinguish
three deﬁnitions of equality, from the most to the least strict:
(a) equality is achieved when MEPs are guaranteed the right to
express themselves and receive communications in their own
language and at the same time all MEPs’ languages are treated
absolutely equally;
(b) equality is achieved when MEPs are guaranteed the right to
express themselves and receive communications in their own
language;
(c) equality is achieved when MEPs are guaranteed at least the
right to express themselves in their own language.
I assume that all MEPs have at least one of the current EU
oﬃcial languages as their mother tongue.19 Now, given that a prin-
ciple of equality must be deﬁned somehow, I deﬁne ‘political cost’
as the abandonment of this principle. The political cost is treated
as a dichotomous variable.
The three deﬁnitions allow us to deﬁne three possible outcomes
of the political debate on equality. We can therefore outline three
diﬀerent scenarios, each scenario being characterised by the impor-
tance it assigns to equality and by the average annual expenditure
ceiling for the EP for the mid-2004–2006 period. Although the
latter ﬁgure is subject to political debate and therefore potentially
18 A triple mediated communication would pose problems related to reliability
and communication lag. For this reason, a doubly mediated message is considered a
binding constraint (International Association of Conference Interpreters – http://
www.aiic.org).
19 For simplicity it is assumed that speakers of minority or extra-European lan-
guages are bilingual, but further research is needed to deliberately take this point into
account. Logically speaking, condition (a) would imply that using a neutral lan-
guage, such as Latin or Esperanto, as the only pivot language would comply with this
condition. Again, for reasons of space, I disregard this option.
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variable, for the purposes of research I use the expenditure ceilings
ﬁxed in 1999, and thus I treat them as an exogenous variable.
Within each of these scenarios, I examine which regimes meet the
condition of ﬁnancial and political sustainability, the latter being
deﬁned as the absence of political cost. If a language regime meets
both conditions, it is said to be ‘eligible’.
One point must be clariﬁed ﬁrst: the ‘nationalisation’ type of
language regime is not very amenable to analysis of political cost,
as it would be up to each Member State to decide whether or not
to provide linguistic services for its language and no information
on their preferences and strategies is available.
In Table 3, I present the average annual cost of each language
regime as well as the proportion of the average annual expenditure
ceiling that this cost represents. Then, I discuss which language re-
gimes comply with the condition of respect for equality, for each of
the three deﬁnitions.
Under the ﬁrst conception of equality (a) all models except for
model 6 give rise to a political cost. In particular, models 4 and 5 do
not strictly comply with the principle of the equal treatment of lan-
guages. It is worth repeating, however, that it is not very clear how
the set of rules and exceptions of the pre-enlargement model would
have been applied to model 5 (see Podesta`, 2001a). In the
pre-enlargement situation, the equality between languages was fully
guaranteed (in spite of some non-systematic exceptions in interpret-
ing) and therefore it could be said to comply with (a) (but see
below). Here, I have made the plausible assumption that some of the
exceptions of the pre-enlargement model would have become more
frequent – therefore making the model too distant from the concep-
tion (a) – but in any case remaining less systematic than model 4.
The systematic use of three pivot languages taken from the set of
oﬃcial languages envisaged in model 4, for example, forces some
MEPs to systematically receive interpreting or translations through
two mediations, and thus to suﬀer the drawbacks pointed out pre-
viously. Moreover, the unequal treatment of languages has also to
be considered in its symbolic dimension. Thus, this regime gives
rise to the unequal treatment of peers because of the inequality in
the use of their languages. Nevertheless, in view of the Berlin
Financial Perspectives, in 2004 choosing the pure full multilingual
model was not a ﬁnancially sustainable option. In this case, the
trade-oﬀ between economic costs and political costs is at its maxi-
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mum: to avoid paying a political cost, we end up paying the
maximum economic cost.
Under the second conception of equality, (b), the only three possi-
ble choices to avoid a political cost in 2004 were models 4–6. Upon
closer examination, however, while both models 4 and 5 ensure com-
pliance with the condition of equality in conception (b), only the con-
trolled multilingualism model comes close to the condition of ﬁnancial
sustainability. Finally, if we adopt the third conception of equality,
(c), language regimes which guarantee equality only among passive
languages become politically acceptable and models of type 3 become
eligible. Models 1 and 2, however, were always politically unaccept-
able and never represented an eligible language regime.
Discussion and Conclusions
Following the research lines of Pool (1996) and Grin (1997), this
paper has assessed six diﬀerent language regimes (seen here as lan-
guage policies) in terms of their ﬁnancial and political sustainability
within three given scenarios, each of them being deﬁned by a cer-
tain outcome of the political debate on equality (in which we delib-
erately do not enter) and by given budget constraints.
According to the results, in the ﬁrst scenario no language regime
was an eligible solution in 2004 (and thus it was not possible to
guarantee maximum equality). In the second scenario, only one
solution was eligible and in the third scenario four language
regimes were eligible. Notice that, as ‘political cost’ is treated as a
dichotomous variable, in the third scenario the only diﬀerence
between models 3 and 4 is that the asymmetric systems are less
expensive. Thus, if we assume that within the group of eligible lan-
guage regimes actors prefer the cheapest one, the asymmetric model
(20-1) should be considered the best.
Note that the controlled multilingualism model is not much
more expensive than asymmetric systems, as it absorbs a percent-
age of the budget just 1% higher than the (20-3) asymmetric sys-
tems and 4% higher than the (20-1) asymmetric system. This means
that ensuring a degree of equality between MEPs higher than the
simple ‘passive equality’, does not cost ‘too much more’ as it could
have seemed at a ﬁrst sight. Finally, data show that both the asym-
metrical model and controlled multilingualism are more expensive
than the pre-enlarged model (+0.001% in terms of EU GDP and
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+0.1 or 0.2 e in terms of per capita costs). However, these diﬀer-
ences appear to be negligible in absolute terms. Moreover, we have
to take into account that the average GDP per capita in the 10
new Member States is much less than the average GDP per capita
in the EU-15.20 This is another element that explains the increase
in per capita costs. On the other hand, data suggest that the only
way to really cut down on expenses for multilingualism is by dras-
tically reducing the number of oﬃcial and working languages and
therefore infringing on even the less strict conception of equality.
Finally, notice that the main conclusions hold also for the 2007–
2013 period when 21 languages are considered, while the ﬁnancial
sustainability gets slightly worse in a scenario with 23 languages
(Table A4).
What was the solution preferred by the EP? The answer to this
key question was ﬁnally that, although ‘the Regulation no. 1/58
allows the institutions a degree of ﬂexibility as regards the use of a
restricted number of working languages to be employed in connec-
tion with their internal activities, [...] the Committee takes the view
that Parliament should not exercise that option for its essential
activities. Instead [...] it wishes to conﬁrm the key provisions of the
Rules of Procedure designed to guarantee full equality between lan-
guages and thus to respect the democratic legitimacy of elected
Members’ (Podesta`, 2001c: 7) – my emphasis.
Therefore, the EP did not choose to adopt asymmetric
systems, and cost reduction was not maximised, implying a pref-
erence for conception (b) over (c). However, the phrase ‘full
equality between languages’ is somewhat misleading, as strictu
sensu model 4 does not comply with the (a) conception of equal-
ity between languages, while the pre-enlargement language regime
did. One could argue that even the pre-enlargement regime did
not strictly comply with the (a) condition of equality, as there
were some exceptions, even if they were considered as temporary
and not systematic. Nevertheless, if this is the case, we could
conclude here that model 4 at least has the merit of maintaining
compliance with the (b) conception of equality and therefore
avoiding political cost.
In any case, even if they are not eligible as a general solution,
this does not mean that there is no room for asymmetric systems.
20 Source: Eurostat.
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According to my estimations, the controlled multilingualism model
would consume, in any case, a slightly higher percentage of the
budget of the EP than the pre-enlargement model. Not surpris-
ingly, the controlled multilingualism regime should be applied only
for plenary sessions, for meetings of the bodies of the EP,21 of par-
liamentary committees and of political groups; in other cases,
systems based on the ‘real needs’ of the Members should be imple-
mented (Podesta`, 2001c: 5–7). This means that where no speciﬁcs
are provided by the rules of procedure and where MEPs decide
that a weakening of the conception of equality is politically more
acceptable – this is likely to be the case for meetings of a non-deci-
sional and non-legislative nature, such as delegations outside the
places of work, for meetings of group leaders, etc. – asymmetric
systems could be used. In relation to this issue, we have to take
into account the fact that the MEPs’ language skills have increased
in the last decade (Mamadouh and Hofman, 2001). However, there
are still groups of monolingual MEPs22 and even ﬂuent knowledge
of a foreign language may not be enough to ensure eﬀective politi-
cal decision-making (Mamadouh and Hofman, 2001: 76).
The current EP language regime is actually based on the con-
trolled multilingualism model, even if, as was foreseeable, it has been
renegotiated and adapted from the previous situation. The number
of pivot languages, for instance, is quite ﬂexible and is not necessar-
ily three (European Parliament, 2004b). In any case, a ﬁrst complete
assessment of this regime can only be made in the future, once the
situation becomes more stable (European Parliament, 2004a).
Further research could be carried out for the other institutions
or bodies, in order to evaluate what language regimes are best sui-
ted to manage multilingualism within each speciﬁc context. For
example, the new system of interpreting ‘upon request’ adopted by
the Council for some preparatory meetings is particularly well sui-
ted to this kind of study. As the total cost of interpreting upon
request needs to be set oﬀ against annual envelopes of e 2 million
in two six-month instalments for each language (Council of the
European Union, 2005), this opens the door to an interesting stra-
tegic interaction between diﬀerent-sized delegations as regards their
language choices.
21 Bureau, Conference of Presidents, College of Quaestors, Conference of Com-
mittee Chairmen and Conference of Delegation Chairmen.
22 Although no data are available on the language skills of the new MEP, it is
reasonable to assume that the percentage of monolinguals MEPS is as least as large
as it was before the enlargement.
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The general working assumptions used are that (Podesta`, 2001c:
11–12). (a) the EP continues to maintain a 20% share of the head-
ing 5 total as the amount earmarked for administrative expenses;
(b) the EP receives a 20% share of the Heading 8 appropriations
earmarked speciﬁcally for administrative expenses; (c) this last
amount is concentrated over two and a half years (mid-2004–2006).
This assumption is reasonable to the extent that the problem of an
increase in the oﬃcial and working languages only arise after
enlargement, i.e., with the start of the 2004–2009 legislature. Notice
that we have used conservative estimates of the EP budget ceilings
as the estimates are computed net of staﬀ contributions to the
pension scheme.
TABLE A2
Costs of multilingualism in the EP in 2002.
Cost of multilingualism Allocation
(%)
Amount e
Directorate general 100 91 707 693
Translators 100 36 029 504
Interpreters 100 33 192 000
Auxiliary session interpreters and freelance translators 15 34 289 377
Subtotal (1): Staﬀ directly involved in multilingualism 195 218 574a
Language courses/subsidies 1 600 000
Quota of members’ secretarial allowances 9 375 000
Buildings and associated expenses 15 895 498
Other expenses (overheads, telecommunications, etc.) 15 445 089
Publication and information expenses 25 131 818
Contributions to expenses of political groups 11 286 330
Subtotal (2): Other expenses attributable to
multilingualism
78 733 735
Total (1+2) 273 952 309
Percentage % of total 2002 preliminary draft estimates 30%
Percentage % on EP expenditure ceiling for 2002
(using Table A3)
27%
Percentage of EU-15 GDP 0.003%
Per capita cost (EU-15) 0.7e
Source: Table compiled by the author using Podesta` (2001a: 12).
aIn eﬀect, taking into account an annual adjustment, the amount of the expenditures
for multilingualism in the EP given in OJ C 219 E, 1 August 2000 (pp. 128–29),
comes close to the amount shown below of 195 million Euro.
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According to oﬃcial ﬁgures (Financial Perspectives, 2007–2013),
the amount of money allocated to administrative expenditures at
2002 prices is on average 6838 e million per year. Assuming that
TABLE A4
Predictions of ﬁnancial sustainability for the EP, 2007–2013, in e m (2002 prices).
Language regime % on EP average
annual expenditure
ceiling with
21 languages (%)
% on EP average annual
expenditure ceiling with
23 languages (%)
Monolingualism 7 7
Reduced multilingualism (6-6) 13 13
Asymmetric system
(2x-1) 28 31
(2x)3) 29 32
(2x)6) 31 34
Controlled multilingualism 33 36
Corrected full multilingualism 38 42
Pure full multilingualism 76 83
Source: Table compiled by the author using Podesta` (2001c: 12) and www.eur-
opa.eu.int.
TABLE A3
Budgetary predictions for the European Parliament 2002–006, in e m (2002).
Financial perspective 2002 2003 2004
(1/2)
2004
(2/2)
2005 2006
Heading 5 –‘administration’ 5012 5119 2612.5 2612.5 5332 5439
(a) Parliament’s share of 20% 1002.4 1023.8 522.5 522.5 1066.4 1087.8
Share of heading 8 administrative
expenses – ‘available for accession’
395 437 240 240 480 480
(b) Parliament’s share of 20% 79.0 87.4 48.0 48.0 96.0 96.0
(c) the amount in (b) is
concentrated over the period
mid-2004–2006 (30 months)
0 0 94 180 180
Total resources of parliament
after enlargement (a+c)
1002.4 1023.8 522.5 616.5 1246.4 1267.8
Annual expenditure ceiling after
enlargement (based on 2 and
a half years)
1252.3
Source: Table compiled by the author using Podesta` (2001c: 12).
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the EP will continue to receive a 20% share of this sum, I calculate
an annual average expenditure ceiling of 1328 e million. Using this
ﬁgure, we get a rough estimate of the ‘‘ﬁnancial sustainability’’ of
each language regime. Figures with 21 languages (say, 20 oﬃcial
languages + Irish) slightly diﬀer from those provided in Table A1,
as social costs considered here do not include higher social costs
for the ﬁrst year (2004) but only social cost from 2007 onwards. To
compute estimates for 23 languages (say, 20 languages + Irish,
Bulgarian and Romanian) I have used a ratio of 23/21.
Types and Techniques of Interpretation and Translation
Passive languages are languages from which interpretation or trans-
lation is provided.
Active languages are languages into which interpretation or
translation is provided. (Full) Symmetric regime: interpretation is
provided directly from and into all languages. The possible linguis-
tic combinations (Ln) are:
Ln ¼ nðn 1Þ; ð1Þ
where n stands for the number of languages considered. With 20
oﬃcial languages we have 380 combinations.
Asymmetric system: the number of languages, which are passive
and active at the same time diﬀers from the number of languages
considered. The typical case is when speakers can speak in their
own language but will only be interpreted into a limited number of
languages. The number of possible linguistic combinations (La) is:
La ¼ aðn 1Þ: ð2Þ
Where n is a given number of languages within which only a are
both active and passive (with a< n and a>1). A 20-6 model
(a = 6 and n = 20) implies 114 combinations.
Relay: interpretation or translation involves two stages: lan-
guage X is interpreted into language Z, known as the ‘pivot’ lan-
guage, and then from language Z into language Y. Assuming that
a message cannot be mediated more than twice, the number of lin-
guistic combinations (Lp) is:
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Lp ¼ pð2n p 1Þ; ð3Þ
where p represents the number of pivot languages and n the total
number of languages considered (where p< n). With 20 languages,
six of which are pivot languages, the number of possible combina-
tions is 198.
Bi-active interpretation: in this case, interpretation into language
B from language A is provided by the same interpreter who inter-
prets from language B into language A.
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